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Urbanization with Chinese Characteristics? China’s Gamble for Modernization 
 
Kristen Looney and Meg Rithmire1 
 
Urban China’s latest man-made disaster struck Shenzhen, a city of over 20 
million people and one of the country’s major economic hubs, on December 20, 2015. A 
massive hillside pile of construction debris, illegally dumped with the complicity of local 
officials, collapsed in the city’s Guangming New District, burying 33 buildings and 
scores of people.2 After the spectacular explosion in Tianjin in August and the seeming 
barrage of reports of urban infrastructure failures throughout the country, one begins to 
wonder if China’s urbanization demands are dramatically outpacing the country’s ability 
to expand urban areas. On the other hand, reports of “ghost cities,” entire cities in the 
middle of the desert or large suburban developments devoid of people, inspire fears that 
China’s supply of urban areas and infrastructure is outpacing demand, fueled by 
unsustainable debt and over-investment.3  
Are Chinese cities the engines of growth for the Chinese and global economy or 
are they ticking time bombs of debt and over-investment? In a sense, they are both. 
Urbanization in China has proceeded this far in spite of serious institutional barriers, but 
those barriers have created significant problems, including urban sprawl, conflict over 
land rights, local government debt, and substantial inequality. A proposed set of reforms 
aims to catalyze rapid urbanization while eliminating the negative economic, 
environmental, and social costs of the previous model.  
The Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) sees this “New-Style Urbanization” and 
the creation of a large and secure middle class as critical to its shift from an investment 
and export-driven economy to one sustained by domestic demand. Instead of relying on 
markets and voluntary migration, the CCP aims to steer the process through its control of 
land, labor, and capital. If it succeeds, China will urbanize hundreds of millions of people 
in the next decades without experiencing the social dislocation and political agitation that 
urbanization historically brings. If it fails, the risks range from simple economic 
stagnation to political and social upheaval.                                                          
1 Kristen Looney is an Assistant Professor at the School of Foreign Service at 
Georgetown University. She is completing a book on rural modernization campaigns in 
China, Taiwan, and Korea. Meg Rithmire is an Assistant Professor and Hellman Faculty 
Fellow at Harvard Business School. Her book, Land Bargains and Chinese Capitalism, 
published in October by Cambridge University Press, is about land politics and 
urbanization in national and subnational strategies of growth in China.  
 
2 Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy. “Shenzhen, Embodying China’s Growth, Falls Risk 
to it.” New York Times. December 22, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/22/world/asia/china-landslide-shenzhen.html?smid=fb-
nytimes&smtyp=cur&_r=1.   
3 Christian Sorace and William Hurst. “China’s Phantom Urbanization and the Pathology 
of Ghost Cities.” Journal of Contemporary Asia. Forthcoming. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2557626 
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Under-Urbanized China? 
 
 Although it has achieved remarkable urbanization, China is still under-urbanized 
relative to its level of industrialization. Unlike most countries that the World Bank 
classifies as “upper middle income,” barely a majority of Chinese residents live in cities.   
Yet at the same time, China’s industrial sector accounts for well over 40 percent of the 
country’s GDP.4  This “industrialization without urbanization” is a unique product of 
institutions that limit the free movement of labor, land, and capital. To understand these 
institutions—and how they fit together—is to understand the past, present, and future of 
urbanization in China.   
The most notorious of these institutions is the household registration system, or 
hukou. Established in 1958, the hukou system divides the population between rural and 
urban and attaches each person’s citizenship to a specific locale. Traditionally, those with 
urban hukou have been entitled to a suite of state-provided benefits denied to rural hukou 
holders, including social insurance, housing, grain rations, and public services. Following 
the introduction of market reforms in the late 1970s, urban labor markets gradually 
opened up to rural residents, but the urban public goods regime remained out of reach. 
Still, the lack of access to public goods has not stopped rural residents from migrating to 
urban centers by the hundreds of millions. Presently, about 17 percent of China’s 
population, or 230 million people, belong to the “floating population” that lives in cities 
but does not possess a local hukou.5 Despite frequent declarations that the CCP intends to 
dismantle the system, reforms have proceeded around the edges of the institution while 
preserving its basic form. By preventing the rural population from settling permanently in 
the cities, the hukou system has created what some scholars have called a rural-urban 
“apartheid.”6  
 Intimately related, China’s system of property rights over land also maintains a 
sharp distinction between rural and urban. In the 1950s, the Constitution enshrined the 
principle of public land ownership: land in urban China is owned by the “state,” and land 
in rural China is owned by the “collective,” or all members of the village. Today, China 
retains public ownership of land while permitting private use in the forms of household 
farming and urban land leasing. This system of property rights has given rise to 
increasing amounts of conflict over the last two decades. 
Private users pay lease fees directly to local governments for periods of 40 to 70 
years, up front in a lump sum. Local governments, ever desirous of more land to generate 
fiscal revenues, convert the status of land from rural to urban (a right only they can 
exercise). It is estimated that land leasing comprises 46 percent of local government 
                                                        
4 Authors’ calculations using data accessed from Work Bank and Economic Intelligence 
Unit.  
5 Kam Wing Chan. “Achieving Comprehensive Hukou Reform in China.” Paulson Policy 
Memorandum. Paulson Institute. December 2014. http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/PPM_Hukou_Chan_English.pdf 
6 For example, Peter Alexander and Anita Chan. “Does China have an Apartheid Pass 
System?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Vol. 30 No. 4 (July 2004).  
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revenue nationwide, and up to 70 percent in some localities.7 In pursuit of greater 
revenue, local governments have been willing to risk social unrest. As cities have 
expanded dramatically, upwards of 88 million peasants have become landless and rural 
land expropriation has become the top source of state-society conflict, accounting for 
about 65 percent of “mass incidents” in rural areas each year.8  
To curb the seemingly limitless expansion of cities, in 2006 the Ministry of Land 
Resources established a “red line” of 297 million acres (120 million hectares) of 
protected farmland and began allocating annual quotas to local governments for land 
conversion.9 Still, urban land has expanded nearly twice as fast as the urban population, 
meaning the growth in urban land far outstrips its use.10 Meanwhile, rural land use is also 
inefficient: because farmers cannot liquidate their holdings of collective land if they 
migrate to the cities, the countryside is peppered with vacant structures and untilled 
fields. This hollowing out of the countryside has elevated concerns about food security 
and raised questions about how China might protect the land rights of villagers (and 
migrants) while also shifting towards industrial agriculture.  
In addition to urban sprawl, rural decline, and conflict over property rights, 
another disturbing outcome of China’s land institutions is over-investment in urban 
construction. Since 2009, investment has held steady at 44 percent of China’s GDP 
(compared to 13-16 percent in the United States), and has been as high as 60 percent in 
some provinces and municipalities.11 The imperative to acquire land for development and 
generate economic growth through investment is visible in the extreme in so-called ghost 
cities, areas of urban expansion with all the makings of a modern city save the residents.   
The rural-urban dichotomies in labor, land and, lastly, capital have been mutually 
reinforcing. The savings rate in China is incredibly high —over 50 percent of GDP in the 
last several years—and has grown as China has grown.12 The high savings rate begs two 
questions: first, why do Chinese households save so much and, second, where do the 
savings go? A complete answer to the savings puzzle has eluded academics and policy-
makers in China and beyond, but several factors are clearly important. First, the 
insecurity of migration in China compels savings. Migrants have no access to a social 
safety net and are all but barred from investment in urban areas. Instead, they save                                                         
7 Landesa, http://www.landesa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Landesa-17-province-
survey.pdf.  
8 Sally Sargeson. “Violence as development: Land expropriation and China’s 
urbanization.” Journal of Peasant Studies. Vol. 40, No. 6, pp.1063-1085.  2013; 于建嵘:
《圈地是城市对浓村掠夺》,《新京报》2010年 11月 5日,第 A21版。 
9 For more on these, see Yuan Xiao. “Making Land Fly: The Institutionalization of 
China’s Land Quota Markets and Its Implications for Urbanization, Property Rights, and 
Intergovernmental Politics.” PhD Dissertation, MIT. 2014.  
10 The specific figure is 1.86 percent faster, meaning that the rate of urban expansion is 
1.86 times rate of urban population expansion. 李祺。《后土地财政的代新型城镇化融
资代偿机制在考虑》. 理论学科。 No. 6, Ser. No. 256. June 2015.  
11 Data from CEIC. For example, Chongqing’s Investment to GDP ratio was 60% in 2010 
and 2011.  
12 Naughton, Barry. 2014. "China's Economy: Complacency, Crisis & the Challenge of 
Reform." Daedalus 143(2):14-25.  
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earnings and remit them to the countryside. Second, peasants and urbanites alike face 
uncertainties of aging and eldercare, a major depressor of consumption in many societies. 
The question of where savings go has profound global implications. Historically, 
capital controls have prevented Chinese households from investing abroad (the abilities 
of wealthy and well-connected families to funnel money into foreign markets 
notwithstanding). Deposit rates in China have also been low, a few percentage points 
below lending rates, and equity markets in China remain underdeveloped. Firms rely on 
banks and retained earnings for investment credit, and households are wary of stock 
markets because of their short and volatile history. It is estimated that only 7 to 11 
percent of Chinese households invest in equities.13 The recent turbulence in stock 
markets is best interpreted as a drama starring and affecting primarily very rich 
individuals alongside millions of small-scale, retail investors who see stock markets as 
something akin to casinos.  
Most Chinese households that can afford it invest in real estate, everything from 
their own, modest urban apartments to second and third investment properties. This same 
pattern holds in the countryside, where the lack of alternatives compels villagers to invest 
in housing despite the absence of formal housing markets (legally, village homes are 
private but not marketable properties). Real estate investment has steadily risen as a 
percent of GDP since the 1990s. Beijing, as a result, has been caught in a delicate dance 
of ensuring that property values appreciate — so as to protect the value of household 
savings — but not so quickly that bubbles develop. Put simply, Chinese household 
savings are trapped domestically, and Beijing can push them into real estate or equity 
markets, but it risks bubbles and distortions in either direction.  
 The other major constraint on China’s fiscal health is local government debt. 
Because of their limited ability to levy taxes or issue bonds, local governments have 
collectively borrowed the equivalent of the U.K.’s GDP, mostly using land as collateral, 
to meet their growing expenses. Given the measures Beijing’s leaders were willing to 
take to halt the stock market decline this summer, including persecuting journalists and 
forcing state firms to buy stock, it is safe to assume they are willing to do whatever is 
necessary to keep property markets afloat. Collapse in real estate risks not only the 
solvency of Chinese households, but the solvency of the state itself.  
Despite the various institutional barriers limiting urbanization in China, it has 
proceeded on a scale unprecedented in human history and facilitated rapid economic 
growth through largely informal processes: migrant labor has made export-oriented 
manufacturing possible, duality in land ownership has kept local governments afloat, and 
household savings have financed urban growth. But, facing low consumption, bloated 
investment, inefficiencies in agriculture, and distortions in land use, that growth model 
seems to have run its natural course. Beijing sees urbanization as the solution to its 
problems, but not in the same form it has taken in China so far and certainly not in the 
haphazard, socially contentious and politically transformative form that it takes in most 
developing countries.   
                                                         
13 For example, see http://fortune.com/2015/09/02/heres-what-you-may-not-know-about-
the-chinese-stock-market/ and  http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-real-
risk-behind-chinas-stock-market-drama.  
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New-Style Urbanization 
 
In anticipation of the leadership change in 2012 and over the first few years of the 
Xi Jinping – Li Keqiang administration, official rhetoric alighted on “New-Style 
Urbanization” as the new, comprehensive strategy for economic growth and 
development. This rhetoric coalesced into the “National New-Style Urbanization Plan, 
2014-2020,” issued in March of 2014. Importantly, the term used for this new form of 
urbanization is better translated as “townification” (as opposed to the more commonly 
used “citification”). The term is intended to connote substantive changes in the 
urbanization process. Rather than a concentrated underclass in megacities, new urbanites 
will be the new middle class in smaller cities. Rather than land-driven, the new 
urbanization will be “people-centered.” It will also be “intensive and functional” in its 
land use and “green and low-carbon” in its environmental impact. Urbanization is 
actually but one of four dimensions of the new strategy. The other three are 
industrialization, digitization, and agricultural modernization.  
The goals of the plan are threefold. First, the plan is clearly articulated as a 
strategy for economic growth and reform. As early as the late 1990s, but most acutely 
since the global financial crisis, China has been in search of a way to stimulate domestic 
demand, and urbanization is said to be a “key driver” in that process. Secure and 
permanent middle class residents buy homes, durable goods to fill those homes, and so 
forth. Turning migrants into permanent urban residents removes a critical source of 
uncertainty that restrains consumption for 17 percent of China’s current population. In 
addition to stimulating domestic demand, the plan intends for urbanization to accelerate 
the “rationalization” of industry by promoting growth in the service sector. Noting that 
China’s service sector lags far behind developed countries and other middle-income 
countries, the plan argues services will become the main source of economic and 
employment growth in China’s cities. If successful, the plan will indeed be a departure 
from China’s old investment-driven growth strategy. The Development Research Center 
of the State Council – a Chinese government think tank - and the World Bank project 
consumption should increase from 46.5 percent of GDP in 2010 to 66.5 percent by 2030, 
while investment should decrease from 48.8 percent to 30.9 percent (see table).  
 
 2010 2012 2020: Plan 
Projection 
2030: World Bank / 
DRC projection 
2030 projection 
without reforms 
Urban Residents 
(% of population) 
  
52.6 
 
60 
 
70 
 
66 
Urban Permanent 
Residents 
(% of population) 
  
 
35.3 
 
 
45 
  
Agriculture Labor 
Force 
(% of labor force) 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.6 
 
 
17.1 
GDP growth 
(Average over last 5 
years) 
 
 
8.5 
 
 
 
  
 
5.2 
 
 
4.9 
Consumption: GDP 46.5   66.5 62 
Investment: GDP 48.8   30.9 35.5 
Source: Shaded columns from Urban China: Toward Efficient, Inclusive, and Sustainable Urbanization. 
DRC/ WB Report; unshaded columns from National New-Style Urbanization Plan.  
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The second goal of New-Style Urbanization is the transformation of the rural 
sector. Since 2004, every annual “Number One Central Document,” which signals 
Beijing’s top policy objectives, has pertained to what is commonly known as the “three 
rural problems” of peasants, villages and agriculture. The Hu Jintao administration’s rural 
development strategy, known as “Building a New Socialist Countryside,” marked an 
important shift from exploiting the rural sector to modernizing and protecting it.14 
However, by most measures agriculture remains highly inefficient. The average farm size 
in China is less than 1 hectare (2.47 acres), and landholdings are often scattered, making 
it difficult for individual households, much less agribusinesses, to scale up production. 
Over one-third of China’s labor force is still employed in agriculture. And while some 
observers point to rising urban wages as evidence that China has run out of surplus labor, 
in reality rural laborers are just stuck in the countryside where they work on average only 
150 days per year.15 The Xi administration’s urbanization agenda aims to reduce the size 
of the agricultural labor force from 38 percent in 2010 to 11.6 percent by 2030. Instead of 
peasants, those who remain in the countryside will be “professional farmers” linked to 
fully commercialized, modern chains of production. 
The last, and perhaps most important, goal of New-Style Urbanization is not 
exactly articulated in the plan but is clearly paramount for China’s leaders: to manage 
urbanization without experiencing destabilizing political change. Jeremy Wallace, a 
Cornell University political scientist, argues that the regime’s ability to limit urbanization 
partially explains its longevity. While regimes throughout the Arab world have fallen to 
popular mobilization, the CCP has steadily prevented what it calls the “Latin 
Americanization” of its cities—finding them overwhelmed by new and informal migrants 
with insatiable social and political demands.16 Indeed, urbanization historically has been 
a process that carries great potential for instability. From the enclosures movement in 
England to the rise of megacities in the contemporary developing world, turning 
agricultural economies into industrial ones and farmers into urbanites has frequently 
given rise to political agitation and social movements that have ended in revolutions and 
regime changes. Mid-20th century social scientists imagined urbanization, along with 
industrialization and agricultural modernization, as the exact social processes that would 
lead to democratization. The late Samuel Huntington saw mass urbanization as a critical 
political moment: either new urban groups’ political aspirations would be integrated into 
institutions or they would overwhelm those institutions, leading to unrest, opposition, and 
violence.17                                                         
14 Looney, Kristen E. 2015. "China's Campaign to Build a New Socialist Countryside: 
Village Modernization, Peasant Councils, and the Ganzhou Model of Rural 
Development." The China Quarterly 224:909-32.  
15 Xin Meng. “Harnessing China’s Untapped Labor Supply.” Paulson Policy 
Memorandum. Paulson Institute. February 2015. http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/PPM_Labor-Supply_Xin-Meng_English.pdf 
16 Wallace, Jeremy L. Cities and Stability : Urbanization, Redistribution, & Regime 
Survival in China. 
17 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1968. Pp. 72-78.  
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Under the new plan, the CCP intends to use precisely the institutions designed as 
barriers to urbanization as levers to control the direction, pace, and volume of migration 
to urban areas. Building urban infrastructure and housing before the urbanites arrive is 
one part of this strategy. What look like ghost cities today could be thriving urban centers 
in a few years. Not since the population transfers associated with Stalin’s mass 
industrialization drive has a state attempted to manage urbanization on this scale. The 
stakes for this “urbanization with Chinese characteristics,” as it is called in China, are 
nothing short of the economic health and social stability of the country.  
 
 
The Reform Agenda 
 
If the plan is heavy on goals with tremendous stakes, it is light on policy specifics. 
That mode of policymaking is nothing new in China, where Beijing typically lays out 
broad objectives and leaves policy details to be worked out in time.18 That sometimes 
works out for incredible good, as local level best practices are scaled up to the national 
level. Other times, local officials distort national policy goals for their own short-term 
gains.19 In any case, we can look to current local and experimental practices as well as 
discussions in Chinese academic and policy circles for clues about how the policy is 
being implemented.  
In general, the plan aims for massive urbanization through the extension of formal 
permanent residency to current and future migrants in small cities and towns rather than 
large urban centers. The projected scale of urbanization is unparalleled: the official plan 
calls for the absorption of 100 million new urban residents and the integration of 140 
million current migrants by 2020. If reforms succeed, hundreds of millions more will be 
urbanized by 2030. The plan is in keeping with the CCP’s longstanding goal of 
preventing urban concentration. But even more explicitly than before, it aims to channel 
migrants into small cities rather than discourage them altogether. As usual, the hukou will 
be the mechanism of control. Most smaller cities and towns with populations under 1 
million will experience full liberalization of residency; medium-sized cities will carry out 
partial liberalization according to specific circumstances; and large cities with 
populations greater than 5 million will continue to be strictly controlled. 
The primary method of inducing migration is linking changes in property rights 
over land with changes in household registration status. Beginning in 2007 in the 
southwestern cities of Chongqing and Chengdu, new experimental programs were 
launched that allowed migrants to acquire urban hukou and trade their rural landholdings 
on quasi-markets. These programs, versions of which can now be found in 29 of 31 
provinces, were the first in China to allow rural residents to initiate the exchange of their 
land rights, and they work to simultaneously induce migration and rationalize land use.                                                         
18 See Heilmann, Sebastian. 2008. "Policy Experimentation in China’s Economic Rise." 
Studies in Comparative International Development 43(1):1-26. doi: 10.1007/s12116-007-
9014-4. 
19 See, for example, Sorace, Christian. 2015. "The Communist Party's Miracle? The 
Alchemy of Turning Post-Disaster Reconstruction into Great Leap Development." 
Comparative Politics 47(4):479-98. 
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Take Chongqing’s “Land Certificate Exchange” as an example. If a rural dweller wants 
to migrate, she may sell the development rights for her homestead (i.e. not her share of 
collective farmland, but her own dwelling land) on the certificate exchange, earning 
compensation and an urban hukou in return. To be sure, few developers are eager to 
acquire isolated pieces of land in the remote countryside. Instead, the certificate exchange 
allows them to buy rights to develop the equivalent area of (rural) land closer to the city 
center. The homestead is then converted into arable land, so that Chongqing’s overall 
quotas for land use are effectively unchanged. The New-Style Urbanization plan calls for 
wide adoption of this kind of tradable homestead right.  
Besides the hukou-land exchanges, another means of attracting migrants is 
through the expansion of public and affordable housing in Chinese cities. The stock of 
rental housing in urban China is small, and migrants have traditionally turned to 
employer-sponsored dormitories or more informal sources of housing, such as makeshift 
structures and basement apartments in “urban villages.”20 If New-Style Urbanization 
succeeds, it will establish affordable, rent-to-own housing reserved specifically for 
migrants. Again, a program in Chongqing is instructive. As land certificate exchanges 
induced migration, the city built enormous public housing compounds to accommodate 
the newcomers. One of the largest, built on the outskirts of the city, housed 30,000 
families in 2012 and was planned for 80,000.21 Although the number of affordable 
housing programs has expanded greatly in recent years, it remains difficult for Beijing to 
realize its lofty goals, primarily because the local actors charged with implementing this 
policy stand to gain financially from using land for higher-end housing and commercial 
development. Instead of mandating that local governments provide housing, the new 
reforms encourage private and public partnerships, such as reserving some space in all 
residential developments for low-income housing.  
Lastly, in the effort to formalize migration, reforms to social welfare systems are 
critical. How will Chinese cities absorb hundreds of millions of new claimants to urban 
public goods and services, including pensions, social insurance, education and 
healthcare? Herein lies a major contradiction in the policy: migrants are attracted to 
medium and large cities where jobs and services tend to be better, yet the plan seeks to 
expand urbanization in small cities. Success, then, would require major reforms to 
existing social welfare systems, the details of which are the least clear in any policy 
statements. Senior officials have discussed the need to “de-link” household registration 
and access to benefits, i.e. by creating a suite of benefits to which each Chinese citizen 
would be entitled no matter where she lives or moves. Such a plan, which seems in 
keeping with the ideas of Finance Minister Lou Jiwei, would constitute an incredible 
centralization of welfare and service provision in China. 
 
China’s Urban Gamble: The Risks  
 
If the Chinese Communist Party has its way in the coming decades, it will manage 
to urbanize hundreds of millions of people, transform agriculture, and sustain economic                                                         
20 Youqing Huang and Chengdong Yi. “Invisible Migrant Enclaves in Chinese Cities: 
Underground Living in Beijing, China.” Urban Studies. Vol 5, No. 15. (2015) 
21 民心佳园. Meg Rithmire visit: July 2012.  
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growth — all without political instability. This exercise in massive state-engineered 
urbanization, however, carries great risks, including social dislocation, concentrated 
poverty, and misguided investments.  
In the countryside, the plan risks provoking farmers’ ire through forced 
relocations and dispossessions. So far, the new land exchange markets have benefitted 
only a small minority of the rural population, owing to their uneven implementation and 
local government interference.22 In fact, the government and corporate farm interests 
stand to gain the most from the exchange markets, since the system of hukou-based land 
rights restricts rural land use to village members. As sociologists Joel Andreas and 
Shaohua Zhan have recently noted, by eroding this system the reforms may actually serve 
as “instruments of rural displacement.”23 Furthermore, village renovation programs, 
which under Hu Jintao were intended to upgrade basic infrastructure, have recently come 
to mean the demolition and reconstruction of entire villages. Equipped with apartment-
style housing, the new villages occupy less land than the old ones, allowing the 
government to transfer “freed up” land for urban use. This often occurs without villagers’ 
knowledge and certainly without proper compensation or change in hukou status. New-
Style Urbanization, despite rhetoric to the contrary, thus perpetuates a view of the 
countryside that is still deeply rooted in urban bias: applying industrial principles to 
agriculture and urban models of residential life to villages. One does not have to look 
hard to find stories of villagers being forced to “move upstairs,” give up their livestock 
and vegetable gardens, and in some cases quit farming altogether.24 
Even if farmers are moved out of the countryside and into the cities without 
significant social unrest, there remain questions about the risks of concentrated poverty in 
urban centers. Anyone familiar with the fraught history of American and European 
housing projects would feel anxious about plans for massive, concentrated, subsidized 
housing.25 In all likelihood, changing migrants’ hukou status will be the easiest part of 
what promises to be a very difficult process of social and economic integration. And 
existing patterns of rural-urban inequality will be reproduced within cities at the 
neighborhood level. Many of the new farmers-turned-urbanites, faced with age and skill 
related barriers to employment, will have to find work in the informal economy. The 
current reforms, in trying to move away from the old model of urbanizing land without 
people, may be creating a new kind of problem—urbanizing people without jobs.  
How will China finance its urbanization plans? Chinese academics and think 
tanks have estimated that the services and infrastructure necessary for urbanizing 
                                                        
22 For more on the problems with quota markets, see Yuan Xiao and Jinhua Zhao. 
“Fixing China’s Distorted Land Quota System.” Paulson Policy Memorandum. Paulson 
Institute. March 2015. http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/PPM_Land-Quotas_Xiao-and-Zhao_English.pdf. 
23 Joel Andreas and Shaohua Zhan. “Hukou and land: Market reform and rural 
displacement in China. Journal of Peasant Studies. 2015, quote p. 3.  
24 See Ong, Lynette H. 2014. "State-Led Urbanization in China: Skyscrapers, Land 
Revenue and “Concentrated Villages”." The China Quarterly 217:162-79. 
25 William Julius Wilson. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and 
Public Policy. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.   
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hundreds of millions by 2030 could cost between 40 and 60 trillion RMB.26 One of the 
greatest risks is that New-Style Urbanization is just like the old in terms of financing: 
relying on local government debt-financed investment. While land-driven debt is 
pervasive throughout urban China, it tends to be greater in smaller, inland cities that have 
limited economic bases and few connections to higher-level politicians who can supply 
funds.27 These, of course, are the exact cities that are expected to incorporate the new 
urbanites. The plan does call for tying fiscal transfers to numbers of new urbanites and 
for reducing reliance on land revenues, but more specific and substantial public finance 
reforms would be required to ensure that urbanization is securely financed. In the short 
term, this means more central fiscal support for expanding cities; in the medium term, 
allowing municipal governments to issue their own bonds; and in the long term, 
establishing a property tax that would give urban governments sustainable and 
predictable revenue streams.  
In 2015, China indeed expanded the municipal bond market substantially, 
approving 2.6 trillion RMB in bonds. Instead of new debt, the majority of bonds 
represented debt restructured from backdoor “local government financing vehicles.”28 
However, this effort to make government financing more transparent appears to be 
failing: after some municipal bond auctions were undersubscribed, local governments 
once again started using backdoor financing platforms to get easier access to funds.29 In 
effect, the effort to restrain shadow lending and expand the bond market amounts to one 
step forward, one step back. Many within and outside of China have called for property 
taxes as a solution to urban fiscal woes, but this would require comprehensive knowledge 
about property ownership, something party-state insiders have long resisted for fear that 
their own assets would be declared. Industry, however, seems in favor of such a tax. 
Zhang Xin of SOHO, one of China’s largest developers, has spoken publicly about the 
need for a property tax to support local governments and reduce distortions in the real 
estate market.30 
 Even causal travelers to China now remark on bus stations to nowhere and large 
residential compounds with no lights on at night. The CCP’s approach to urbanization 
really is “If you build it, they will come.” The levels of under-urbanization and professed 
state support for urban expansion give reason to think that, in fact, these bus stations and 
residential compounds may be teeming with urban life in a few years. The risk is that the 
central and local arms of the state, rather than markets, will determine which cities grow                                                         
26李祺 (Li Qi)。《后土地财政的代新型城镇化融资代偿机制在考虑》(Considering 
Some Mechanisms for Finance and Compensation for New Urbanization after the era of 
Land Finance). 理论学科 (Theory)。 No. 6, Ser. No. 256. June 2015. Different estimates 
from CDRF, China Development Bank, etc.  
27 You-tien Hsing. “Urbanization of the Local State in China.” Working paper.  
28 On these, see Shih, Victor C. 2010. "Local Government Debt: Big Rock-Candy 
Mountain." China Economic Quarterly 14(2):26-32. 
29 Nathaniel Taplan. “China leaves back door ajar in municipal bond market.” Reuters. 
August 17, 2015. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/16/uk-china-economy-lgfv-
idUKKCN0QL0V320150816 
30 Leslie Shaffer. “Why China Needs a National Property Tax.” March 6, 2014. 
http://www.cnbc.com/2014/03/06/why-china-needs-a-national-property-tax.html. 
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and in what direction. If local economic activity does not also follow the construction, 
migrants will not be attracted to these areas and they might remain ghost cities. Clearly, 
the CCP has decided that the risks of these bad investments are more palatable than the 
consequences of uncontrolled and unmanaged urbanization.  
Perhaps the biggest risk of all is that nothing happens. From the current vantage 
point, that possibility is real. Despite intense discussion of New-Style Urbanization and 
the policy clearly being a centerpiece of the Xi-Li administration, little progress has been 
made on reforms in the last three years. Xi Jinping’s political priority has most obviously 
been rooting out corruption in the Party itself, and the urbanization plan and economic 
reforms, largely seen as the projects of Li Keqiang, have taken a back seat. One 
optimistic interpretation of Xi’s efforts is that serious reform requires a level of Party 
discipline impossible without the anti-corruption efforts, and the institutional reforms will 
follow the anti-corruption campaign. Another view is that the Party itself has become so 
mired in internal strife that the new leadership is incapable of realizing even its most 
central ambitions. 
 
China’s Urban Moment  
 
 The scale of China’s urban ambitions has prompted comparisons with other 
societies at moments of incredible transformation. In particular, proposed changes in land 
and labor institutions have begged the question of whether this is China’s “enclosures” 
moment, referencing the process of privatizing previously common land in England that 
began in the 18th century. The Enclosure Acts forced landless rural dwellers to migrate to 
cities, where they became the industrial working class and, eventually, agitators for 
political representation and economic redistribution. 
 The social and political consequences of the enclosures are precisely what China 
is trying to avoid. The proposals for urbanization and economic transformation are not a 
radical departure from the institutions that have structured Chinese society for the last 30 
years. Instead of eliminating the walls between village and city, the reforms would allow 
land, people, and capital to more formally traverse the rural-urban boundary and attempt 
state control of the process. In all of the varied interpretations of these reforms, one 
should not mistake them for privatization of land.  
 If the correct analogy is not to the enclosures, a more dire scenario is that it could 
resemble the Stalinist population movements and China’s own Great Leap Forward. 
Historically, massive state attempts at engineering social processes have proven more 
disastrous than ad hoc urbanization. So far, New-Style Urbanization reforms have not 
been accompanied by the kind of politicization and mobilization that precludes dissent 
and silences policy feedback. If Chinese leaders are to succeed in producing a modern, 
urbanized society without the discipline of markets, the best hope is that they include the 
participation of rural and urban citizens, whose voices may be the bellwether of China’s 
urban future. 
 
